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Spiritual Objectivity
A systematic expansion of the body-mind-problem
Axel Hutter
Abstract
The article develops the thesis that spiritual objectivity constitutes an 
independent class of phenomena besides the physical and the mental. 
The concept of spiritual objectivity presents a solution for the mediation 
between the bodily and the conscious by further developing the insight 
of critical monism that individual action can neither be subsumed under 
the phenomena of the bodily outer world nor under the phenomena 
of the mental inner world. Referring to Gottlob Frege’s thesis that 
what distinguishes a thought from other phenomena is its capability 
of being true, the article develops the argument that the thought in its 
spiritual objectivity should be distinguished from the psychic inner 
world of ideas as well as from the physical exterior world of material 
objects. The possibility of rational recognition is dependent upon 
this genuinely spiritual mediation of inner and outer world, and its 
objective truth must be distinguished from the constitutive subjectivity 
of psychic phenomena. This specified concept of the spiritual is not 
intended to enlarge the substance dualism between the bodily and 
the mental once again but makes it possible to determine the in itself 
differentiated unity of the bodily and the mental, namely as spiritual 
unity of body and mind.
I Introduction
The following considerations are meant to make a contribution to the mind-
body-problem, by questioning an important presupposition of the ongoing 
discussion of the problem. The presupposition consists in the belief that the 
contrasting difference between “bodily” and “conscious” represents a complete 
distinction. In other words: All phenomena can be classified as either “physi-
. First published in Das Leib-Seele-Problem (Hermanni and Buchheim 2006).
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cal” or as “mental” – tertium non datur. Contrary to this idea this paper will 
show that spiritual objectivity constitutes an independent class of phenomena 
besides the physical and the mental. This is so, because the spiritual possesses 
an objective logic of its own that is specifically different from that of bodily 
and conscious phenomena. If this is true, then there are good reasons for in-
troducing the as of yet excluded third into the debate, which will then not only 
be systematically expanded, but fundamentally redefined.
This opening seems at first only to complicate and add to the confusion of 
the mind-body-problem, as one can now additionally expect to be confronted 
with both a body-spirit-problem and a mind-spirit-problem. This paper will, 
therefore, attempt to show that the body-mind-problem is not burdened with 
additional problems, when attention is directed at the specific logic of spiritual 
objectivity, but that instead this view can offer a solution. This is so, because 
the spiritual taken objectively, this being the central thesis, is exactly what 
establishes the mediation between the bodily and conscious phenomena and 
this addresses the crucial theme of the body-mind-problem. In this way the 
spiritual is not a numerical third in constrast to the physical and the mental, 
but a third in the sense of their unity, and only as such – as their unity – is it a 
third in constrast to the elements that are mediated through the unity. 
The spiritual, as it is understood here, differs from the mental in the sense 
of a subjective inner world just as it differs from the bodily in the sense of 
an objective outer world. Should it be possible to characterize the concept 
of spiritual objectivity in the above mentioned way, then the concepts of the 
bodily and the mental would become more concise and gain in clarity. So, 
singular elements of the spiritual, which as of yet are not acknowledged and 
understood as qualitatively independent, must, unknowingly, be included in 
the understanding of the bodily and the conscious, as long as one assumes that 
the separation of the bodily and the mental is a complete distinction, meaning 
that all phenomena must be classified according to it. In this way the suggested 
systematic expansion of the central conceptual constellation would benefit all 
2. Peter Bieri has summarized the point in the following way: ‘The intuitive contrast between 
mental and physical [...] has universal validity. If one were to expand upon this allusion to our 
confident dealings with the differentiation, it would go to say that we can classify every phe-
nomenon, with which we are faced, in the following way: Every phenomenon is either mental 
or physical’ (Bieri 997, p. 3).
3. Why the concept of ‘spiritual objectivity’ was chosen for the third class of phenomena can 
only be explained and justified through the following argumentation. 
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek der LMU Muenchen
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 05.11.15 09:56
6 Spiritual Objectivity
the concepts, since the concepts within the constellation border on to each 
other and therefore illuminate each other reciprocally. 
Arising from this, the individual steps in the argumentation are presented. 
However, at certain points they have to proceed in a somewhat fragmented 
and provisionary manner, in order to accomplish its goal within the given 
framework. At first I shall point out in detail what the real problem of the mind-
body-problem consists of (II). Then I will give a comprehensive presentation of 
a classical position within the discussion, namely that of Peter Strawson (III), 
because it comes quite close to the solution envisioned here (although with-
out specific mentioning of the concept of the spiritual). From there a justified 
objection against Strawson’s suggestion will be considered and the proposal 
will be modified (IV). The following step will expose the as of yet unnoticed 
peculiarity of the spiritual (V). Finally, I will show that the introduction of 
the spiritual does not destroy the modified proposal of Strawson, but rather 
deepens it, because thereby it is possible to give an adequate determination of 
the unity of bodily and conscious that he envisioned (VI).
II. The opposition between dualism and monism
From a purely formal point of view one is faced with a proper systematic 
problem, as soon as one has good reasons to accept at least two differing 
claims, which contradict each other mutually. Now, the problem of the mind-
body-problem consists first and foremost in the plausibility of two fundamental 
intuitions or leading motives of thought, which at first appear to contradict 
each other. For the purpose of this discussion these motives will be presented 
as the “dualistic” intuition and the “monistic” counterintuition. 
The fundamental “dualistic” intuition is elucidated by departing from firmly 
established differentiations that are found in our everyday language. As such 
. Once one has become aware of the question of the independence of the spiritual from the 
bodily and mental, one encounters several hints that point in that direction within the ongoing 
discussion of the body-mind-problem. Richard Rorty claims that the so-called ‘Identity Theory’ 
states ‘that sensations (not thoughts) are identical with certain brain-processes’. And Rorty adds: 
‘I include only sensations in the scope of the theory because the inclusion of thoughts would 
raise a host of separate problems [...] and because the form of the Identity Theory, which has 
been most discussed in the recent literature restricts itself to a consideration of sensations’ (Rorty 
965, p. 25 and p. 25, note , my abbreviations).  
5. This characterization is oriented toward the Antithetic of pure Reason as in Kant ‘The antithetic 
does not, therefore, deal with one-sided assertions. It treats only of the conflict of the doctrines 
of reason with one another and the causes of this conflict’ (KrV A421/B448).
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the sentence ‘something is lying on the ground’ is clearly differing from the 
sentence ‘someone is lying on the ground’ (cf., Spaemann 996). For the 
expressions ‘something’ and ‘someone’, though indefinite, make it clear in a 
very determinate way that their difference in meaning is neither gradual nor 
superficial, but rather a deeply rooted qualitative opposition. Of course it is a 
common intuition that such an opposition is quite obvious. However, it is the 
particular essence of such an intuition that it is not nearly as easy to conceptual-
ize exactly what it is that is so obvious, as it is to establish that it is. 
In a preliminary attempt at an approach it appears that we are intuitively 
convinced that the specific “subjective” perspective of conscious experience 
is principally different from any event or object that is available through an 
“objective” description, whereby the way of being of the subjective inner world 
is never fully in agreement with the way of being of the objective outer world. 
Wittgenstein argues in the same manner: ‘The kernel of our proposistion that 
that which has pains or sees or thinks is of a mental nature is only that the word 
“I” in “I have pains” does not denote a particular body, for we can’t substitute 
for “I” a description of a body’ (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 74).
Therefore pebbles or the neurophysiologic processes of the brain are clearly 
physical phenomena, whereas sensations of pain or the feelings of someone in 
love just as clearly belong to the mental realm of phenomena. What is justified 
in this position should here with some caution be termed a descriptive dualism 
between bodily and mental predicates. However, such a dualism quite clearly 
establishes the systematic condition which ensures that it is meaningful at all 
to speak of a body-mind-problem. For without appeal to a descriptive dualism 
one cannot even approach the problem, as the consideration of a body-body-
problem or a mind-mind-problem makes no sense at all. 
The fundamental intuition contrary to this is the motive of unity or a 
“monistic” intuition. It is founded in the conviction that everything we call 
“reality” in the end must be one. If one acknowledges the justification of this 
conviction, then it is immediately implied that the dualism between bodily and 
mental outlined above can under no circumstance be reified as an ontological 
dualism of substance in which the bodily reality is radically separated from the 
mental. Still, the rejection of a dualistic notion of reality motivated by monism 
leaves it open to question of how the descriptive (non-ontological) dualism of 
objective outer world and subjective inner world is to be judged. Here we are 
6. Thomas Nagel is a prominent advocate of this argument (cf. Nagel 97).
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faced with a fundamental alternative that enables us to distinguish between a 
dogmatic and a critical monism. 
Dogmatic monism understands the unity of reality as something immediately 
given. Therefore it usually takes the form of naturalism, since reality is more 
impressive when it is understood as the naturally given and empirically 
comprehensible objects. The simple conclusion therefore is: since bodily 
objects are real and since reality is one, it follows that reality consists of bodily 
objects. Consequently, the descriptive dualism of bodily and mental can only 
be given a very low systematic value from this point on. If it is certain from the 
outset that everything real, without exception, takes the form of a body, then the 
only reality that can be ascribed to mental phenomena is that of a (more or less 
interesting) illusion. Thus, the body-mind-problem is really just a deception, 
which only appears when unjustified importance is granted to the descriptive 
dualism. Dogmatic monism, therefore, “solves” the body-mind-problem by 
depriving it of its validity of being considered a genuine problem. 
Contrary to this, critical monism finds the descriptive dualism to be justified in 
exactly the sense that the body-mind-problem is taken to be a genuine problem. 
It rejects letting the difference between physical and mental evaporate into a 
mere illusion and thus shares the viewpoint of descriptive dualism, which allows 
for a specific independent meaning of the inner world of the subject. Against 
this dualism, however, it makes the critical point that it cannot be justified 
to limit the I to the pure world of human self-experience. For a human being 
understands himself first and foremost as someone who acts, as an agent, and 
interestingly no action conceived as action (however one chooses to understand 
it) can clearly be subsumed under the phenomena of the bodily outer world, 
nor under the phenomena of the mental inner world.
The following considerations are meant to further develop this insight of 
critical monism. The core problem of the body-mind-problem is accordingly 
found to consist in the following dilemma: without the dualism of mind and 
7. The systematic mirror image of dogmatically founded naturalism of an absolutely posited 
bodily outer world is the dogmatically founded mentalism of an absolutely posited inner world 
of mind. 
8. Plato has described those who take this stand in a classic way: they ‘drag down everything 
from heaven and the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and trees with their hands; for 
they lay their hands on all such things and maintain stoutly that that alone exists which can be 
touched and handled; for they define existence and body, or matter, as identical, and if anyone 
says that anything else, which has no body, exists, they despise him utterly, and will not listen 
to any other theory than their own’ (Plato 1928, 246a).
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body it is impossible to genuinely consider the question posed by the problem, 
and with the dualism one cannot give an answer to the question, since human 
self-experience includes phenomena, which cannot be captured by the clean 
differentiation between bodily and mental. In this way, however, a general 
structure is prefigured, to which any possible solution must conform: it must 
take the shape of a mediated monism that is of a unity of unity and difference. 
In other words: it must clarify a unity of body and mind, in which unity is not 
established in spite of, but rather founded on, the internal differentiation. 
III. Personal unity
The position developed by Peter Strawson in his Individuals (959) is a position 
in the recent discussion of the body-mind-problem that comes quite close to 
this prescribed structure. The in itself differentiated unity of bodily and mental 
sought for is conceptualized as “person” by Strawson. He says of a person: 
‘What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such 
that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing 
corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable to a 
single individual of that single type’ (Strawson 959, p. 02). Another way of 
saying this would be that it is not only always possible to ascribe two different 
kinds of predicates to a person, but that it is always necessary to do so. The 
first kind includes the predicates that are correctly used of material bodies. 
These are called “M-predicates” by Strawson; they include predicates such as 
“weighs 5 kg” or “lies on the floor”. The second kind includes all other predi-
cates, which we use for persons, meaning predicates such as “plays tennis” or 
“suffers pain”. Strawson refers to these as “P-predicates”. 
The real point of this approach, however, is Strawson’s terming the in 
itself differentiated unity of a person logically “primitive” or “primary”. It 
is important to note here that Strawson’s claim that the concept of a person is 
logically primitive should not be misunderstood to implicate that the concept 
of a person cannot or may not be divided into parts. This exactly contradicts 
what Strawson himself demonstrates with his division in M- and P-predicates, 
namely that the concept of a person contains an internal division, which is 
crucial for the adequacy of his analysis. In Strawson’s thought, the expression 
logical “primitivity” should therefore be understood in the sense of an epistemic 
9.  Therefore Strawson stresses that ‘[i]t is important to realize the full extent of the acknowl-
edgement one is making in acknowledging the logical primitiveness of the concept of a person’ 
(Strawson 959, p. 03–0).
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek der LMU Muenchen
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 05.11.15 09:56
0 Spiritual Objectivity
priority. A primitivity understood in this sense includes the possibility to analyze 
the primary concept of the person and find partial moments later on, e.g. bodily 
or mental phenomena. However, the idea that the concept of a person could 
be composed of parts, which were more fundamental than the concept of the 
person itself is ruled out. For the partial aspects of persons can, thus goes 
Strawson’s central thought, only be recognized when persons as such have 
been recognized beforehand.
Thus, the crucial point in Strawson’s thesis of the logical “primitivity” of 
the concept of a person only becomes quite clear, when one understands the 
logical “primitivity” in the sense of an epistemic priority. For in this case 
it becomes unmistakably clear, why the reality of a person should not be 
understood as ‘secondary to two primary sorts of entities’, i.e. as secondary 
to ‘a particular consciousness and a particular human body’ (Strawson 959, 
p. 05). From this mistake, namely, the Cartesian mistake of a dualism of 
substance between the thinking and the extensional would arise. Therefore, 
the concept of a person should not be analyzed as ‘that of an animated body or 
of an embodied anima’ (Strawson 959, p. 03), since the unity in the concept 
of a person in this way can only appear as something composed and in this 
sense secondary. Thereby, the original unity of the person is missed because 
it requires that the relation between body and soul that is endemic to personal 
unity is given epistemic priority over that which is connected and at the same 
time divided in the relation.
What follows from these beginnings may at first sight seem surprising, but 
nonetheless it is a strictly inferred consequence that the concept of a person is 
also ‘logically prior to that of an individual consciousness’ (Strawson 959, p. 
03). The concept of a purely subjective consciousness does therefore not offer 
any adequate point of orientation, from which the concept of a person could be 
explained and analyzed. ‘It can exist only, if at all, as a secondary non-primitive 
concept, which itself is to be explained, analyzed, in terms of the concept of 
a person’ (Strawson 959, p. 02–03). Following on this the widely spread 
conviction that each individual consciousness disposes of a private, exclusive 
access to itself, in which the consciousness can always grasp itself adequately 
and completely seems misguided. For if the purely individual inner world is 
epistemically secondary to the person, which represents a primary unity of 
outer- and inner world, then the retreat into the inner is a retreat to something 
that is merely a partial aspect of the original and basic personhood.
If one wants to clarify these not entirely simple thoughts by means of ex-
amples, it is worth considering the P-predicates that designate an action, which 
on the one hand presupposes an intention or at least a consciousness in general 
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and on the other hand is realized in a characteristic type of bodily movement. 
Good candidates for such P-predicates could be “to go for a walk”, “to wind 
a rope”, “to play ball” or “to write a letter”. For these predicates, according 
to Strawson, make clear the interesting peculiarity of many P-predicates “that 
one does not, in general, ascribe them to oneself on the strength of observa-
tion, whereas one does ascribe them to others on the strength of observation’ 
(Strawson 959, p. ). Nonetheless, no one would deny that it is one and 
the same thing, which is being ascribed in two different ways – once from the 
inside and once from the outside. 
Another, less simple example should make the implications of Strawson’s 
beginnings completely clear. We say – taking a perspective from the outside 
– that a person can behave in a depressed manner, and we also say – taking 
a perspective from the inside – that a person can feel depressed. It is often 
tempting to argue, says Strawson, ‘that feelings can be felt but not observed, 
and behaviour can be observed but not felt, and that therefore there must be 
room here to drive in a logical wedge’ (Strawson 1959, p. 108). Considering 
the argument so far, however, it becomes clear that the correctly understood 
concept of being depressed exactly connects to that place, into which one 
wanted to drive the wedge of a consolidated dualism. For depression is always 
the depression of a particular person and not the depression of a pure, bodiless 
consciousness. In order for it to be at all possible that there is a concept like 
that of a person’s depression, the concept must cover both: that which is felt by 
the person in question, but not being observed, and that which is observed by 
other persons, but cannot be felt. The depression of one particular individual 
person is therefore only that which it is, if it is an in itself differentiated unity, 
i.e. one and the same, which on the one hand can be felt from the inside, and 
on the other can be observed from the outside.
I believe that Strawson’s work towards establishing an original unity of the 
physical and psychological that is differentiated in itself, is a very plausible 
beginning of a solution of the mind-body problem. For the impression of the 
impossibility of resolving this problem is indeed springing from the fact that the 
structure of personal unity of body and mind, which has been presented above, 
is not understood. In this way it is overlooked that the P-predicates could not 
have any of the two aspects of their use – neither the ascription to oneself, nor 
the ascription to others – if they did not simultaneously have the other. This 
mostly implies that one of the two aspects in the “logically primitive” unity of 
the personhood is being isolated and considered as independent, whereby the 
other aspect must appear as problematic and “unreal”. And so, thinking oscil-
lates between a skepticism that puts the existence of the outer world in doubt 
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on the basis of a primary inner world, and a behaviourism that questions the 
existence of a subjective inner world on the basis of a primary outer world. But 
neither can the exit strategy of substance dualism, which conceives both partial 
aspects as equally independent and substantial, lead us out of the dilemma, 
since here too the personal, in itself differentiated unity of body and mind, is 
missed and the interaction between them becomes unthinkable.
Following on from this discussion the attempt at establishing an epistemically 
primary unity of body and mind seems to be the only option, which at the 
same time gives good reasons to oppose an eliminative materialism, as well 
as an eliminative mentalism; furthermore, however, these reasons are also 
valid against the fortification of the descriptive difference between bodily and 
mental predicates to a substance dualism.
IV. Liveliness and personality
At this point, however, an important objection to Strawson’s work must be 
considered – as it was discussed in the introduction. The objection stems from 
Harry Frankfurt, who contrary to Strawson asserts that besides the human being 
‘there are a lot of other entities that have mental as well as physical capabilities’. 
The identification of the in itself differentiated unity of body and mind with 
human personhood can thus not entirely convince us, because the concept 
of the person is too exclusive for the elucidation of the basic structure that 
Strawson has made topical, while the basic structure on the other hand is too 
unspecific for the proper understanding of being a person. ‘It does violence to 
our language,’ says Frankfurt, ‘to endorse the application of the term ‘person’ 
to those numerous creatures which do have both psychological and material 
properties but which are manifestly not persons in any normal sense of the 
word’ (Frankfurt 97, p. 5).
Frankfurt’s objection makes a crucial point: Strawson’s “primary” unity of 
M- and P- predicates is in fact not specific enough to decide on the question 
of personhood. From this, however, it certainly does not follow that the this 
initial work should just be discarded. Rather, taking the justified criticism of 
Frankfurt into consideration can lead to a modification and further development 
of Strawson’s beginnings in two respects: firstly, the general structure of 
unity as such must be defined in its own right, without taking the specifics of 
personhood into accout; secondly, on this conceptual background, the specific 
structure governing personhood must be decided, something which will be 
achieved by pulling forward a central moment of personality that has not been 
taken into consideration so far.
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If the in itself differentiated unity of M- and P- predicates that has been 
analyzed by Strawson is not exclusively a characteristic of personhood, then 
it must be characteristic for a much wider realm. The in itself differentiated 
unity of the bodily and the mental, outside and inside perspectives, can namely 
be considered as the central characteristic of the living. For every single living 
cell already realizes the very peculiar structure of an in itself differentiated 
unity of outer and inner spaces. This is at the same time the precondition 
and the result of an inner expediency of every living creature that concretely 
manifests itself in the capability of an ordered, life-preserving exchange with 
the outside world. 
In this sense, life can basically be understood as an active realization in 
which inner and outer moments constitute a necessary and “primitive” unity, 
which is (epistemically) primary and at the basis of the moments, so that we 
can only win the concepts of an outer environment and an inner expediency 
from the starting point of a logically primary concept of life. Or put in another 
way: Everywhere, where there is self preservation (i.e. life), there is also at the 
very least a weak and rudimentarily developed self, which is to be sustained 
and in this way differentiates itself as an “inner” from an “outer” that confronts 
it. In this differentiation, however, that which preserves itself at the same time 
relates to its environment, since a living being can only sustain itself, when it 
is at the same time interwoven with and separated from its environment. 
Life thus conceived as expedient activity of self preservation also contains 
a tendency to development, in which the internally differentiated unity 
continuously becomes more differentiated; at the same time, however, as 
the growing differentiation develops, the synthetic moment of unity also 
distinguishes itself more strongly. The evolution of the living thus realizes 
itself in between two borderlines: between the world, in which there is as yet 
no inner unity of the differentiated, the reality of the inorganic, and the world, 
where the inner unity of life comes to consciousness of itself – what can be 
considered as the personal reality of the human being. 
The transference from livelihood to personality could provisionally, as Robert 
Spaemann explicates it, be understood as an ‘increased form of interiority’. 
‘As reflection, on the basis of which human beings can relate to their own 
vital interiority’ (Spaemann 996, p. 9). This understanding, however, as 
Spaemann emphasizes, does not fit the specific reality of personhood, since 
it can only determine its reflexive self relationship as interiority. The person 
is, as it were, ‘neither inside nor outside’. For the form of reality specific to it 
‘transcends the difference between inside and outside that is constitutive for 
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everything psychic’ (Spaemann 1996, p. 48). The specific dignity of the person 
thus emanates from the unity of the living, but it is not exhausted in it.
This insight shows the way ahead for the following line of thought. For just as 
well as the living in itself can be understood as a differentiated unity of physical 
outer- and psychic inner world, it remains for itself bound to the psychic inner 
perspective of its vital point of view and thereby to the difference between 
self and environment, which is in the end constitutive for life. The possibility 
of reflection on the living, however, marks the specific essence of personality, 
which always already must have transcended that to which it is able to relate 
itself understandingly. Still, life represents the basis of personhood. It must 
therefore be decided more specifically, how much of the differentiated unity, 
which we designate exclusively with the concept of a person, can stand out 
from the general unity, which can be described – as it was suggested here – by 
the concept of living activity.
Persons possess an ability, which at first grows in them as a result of their 
livelihood: they can value. The measure for the valuations of the living is 
ultimately self-preservation, on which each singular valuation bases itself: vital 
valuations are therefore made possible through the “inner perspective” of the 
interest of life in question and thus remain “relative” – related to the particular 
need in question. Accordingly, persons have a consciousness of the fact that 
their valuation, their praise and blame10, often has a “subjective” or “partial” 
character, in which their particular individual point of view and interests are 
expressed. Obviously, the person knows that its point of view is a particular 
one, as long as it only describes a perspective that is always subjective. This 
reflective knowledge, however, implies a rational moment of reason, which 
transcends the subjective inner world, a moment, which ultimately makes the 
person what it is, and which in the following will be discussed as the moment 
of spiritual objectivity.11
The concept “spiritual objectivity” is particularly adequate, because the 
rational moment of personhood now in question obviously represents a third 
class of phenomena in relation to the bodily and the mental phenomena, al-
0.  Strawson has effectively pointed to the fact that persons are primarily characterized by their 
evaluative and at the same time participatory attitude towards other persons, in comparison to 
which a distanced and “value free” attitude, through which other persons are factualized and 
objectified, can always only have a secondary significance (Strawson 2003).
. In the philosophical tradition, the moment of rationality has been characteristic for the concept 
of a person from the beginning, like when the “classical” definition by Boethius shows, which 
understands the person as naturae rationalibis individual substantia. 
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though this third class also unites important features of the two other classes of 
phenomena in it. For on the one hand, the spiritual distinguishes itself from the 
inner world of the psychic in as much as a general, over-individual validity is 
available to it – somewhat in analogy to the inter-subjectively accessible world 
of bodily objects – so that the person, which relates itself rationally to something 
spiritual, transcends the boundaries of a merely subjective interiority.  On the 
other hand, this objectivity of the spiritual is also different from the presence 
of bodily objects, since the spiritual is always also thought to display a norma-
tive character, which – somewhat in analogy to mental phenomena – cannot 
be grasped as an object, but only in a subjective carrying-out. Therefore, the 
objectivity of the spiritual can also be characterized with Hegel as the being 
in and for itself, which differentiates itself from the being in itself of bodily 
phenomena, as well as from the being for itself of mental phenomena, because 
it unites both moments in it.
V. Truth
The further consideration of this concept of spiritual objectivity will again be 
informed by a classical position of the 20th century, in this case from Gottlob 
Frege’s article ‘The Thought: A Logical Inquiry’ (956).2 Frege takes as his 
starting point a positive and a negative determination. He argues positively 
that the thought is different from other phenomena therein that it is capable of 
being true. This, however, only gains its systematic profile by being connected 
to the negative thesis that the moment of truth in the thought or in logic is not 
to be described in conformity with psychological laws. One could, as it were, 
according to Frege, ‘come to believe that logic deals with the mental process 
of thinking and the psychological laws in accordance with which it takes place. 
This would be a misunderstanding of the task of logic, for truth has not been 
given the place which is its due here. Error and superstition have causes just 
as much as geniune knowledge’ (Frege 1956, pp. 289–290).
With this initial consideration, Frege has already marked the qualitative dif-
ference between psychological phenomena on the one hand and phenomena 
of thought or logic on the other: ‘The assertion both of what is false and of 
what is true takes place in accordance with psychological laws. A derivation 
from these and an explanation of a mental process that terminates in an as-
sertion can never take the place of a proof of what it asserted’ (Frege 956, 
p. 290). The specific logic of thinking as such – exactly “logic” – thereby (on 
2. Originally published in Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus in 1918.
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the basis of its specific validity, the truth of which cannot for principal reasons 
be traced back to mental processes), constitutes the autonomous particularity 
of the spiritual.
One should therefore distinguish very carefully between that which is the 
content of consciousness, i.e. an idea [Vorstellung], and that which is the object 
of thinking, i.e. that which is thought or simply the thought. The spiritual ob-
jectivity of the thought should thus be outlined more carefully in two aspects. 
Firstly, in a foundational step, the thought in its spiritual objectivity should be 
distinguished from the psychic interior world of the ideas. The next step is to 
distinguish the thought in its spiritual objectivity from the physical exterior 
world of physical objects.
Ideas are not physical objects: they ‘cannot be seen or touched, cannot be 
smelled, nor tasted, nor heard’ (Frege 956, p. 299). If, for instance, I see 
something green, then I have a visual experience, the visual impression of 
green. I have it, but I do not see it. In this sense, ideas are something you have, 
but are not something which you sensually grasp. In the same way, you have 
sensations, feelings, moods, inclinations, wishes. An idea, which someone 
has, thereby – exactly because and in as far as it is something someone has 
– belongs to the content of that someone’s consciousness.
From this necessarily follows the fundamental character of all ideas; that they 
are always ideas of an individual singular consciousness. For it belongs to the 
essence of every idea of a specific consciousness that every idea of another 
consciousness exactly as such is different from it. For every idea has exactly 
only one bearer, so that it is not possible that two humans could have the same 
idea. For if two humans did have exactly the same idea, this idea would be 
independent from the bearer in question – which would then contradict the 
fundamental definition of “idea” always to be in need of a bearer. Ideas can 
therefore not be without an individual consciousness, since they would not 
have any independent existence without an individual bearer (cf. Frege 956, 
pp. 299ff). 
In comparison, the thought – in sharp opposition to the idea – is something 
over-individual, which is available to all humans in the same measure, if 
they are able to grasp the thought in thinking. In comparison to the interior 
subjectivity of the mental idea, the spiritual obtains an important moment of 
objectivity. This objectivity, however, should not be thought of as the exteriority 
of physical objects, as discussed below. 
Outer objects are existing and non-existing, they have certain bodily charac-
teristics, others not, but they are never, and that for principal reasons, true or 
false. The difference between “true or false” has no application in the field of 
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the material outer world. To be distinguished sharply from this are, of course, 
statements about the outer world, which certainly – as statements – can be 
true or false; for statements are ultimately only statements, or claims about a 
matter of fact, because they can be true or false.
A certain physical object may weigh 5 kg or not, but it is in no case true or 
false. The statement that a certain physical object weighs 5 kg can however 
be true or false; but even in the case of a true statement, the statement itself 
does not weigh 5 kg, it does not have any physical weight at all, nor any 
other physical characteristic. The statement that wood can burn is certainly 
adequate; but from this it does not follow that the true statement itself can 
burn. A true (or false) statement that relates to something physical, is thus 
never itself something physical, because it does not and can not display any 
physical characteristics. 
The entirely justified urge of natural science to rely on facts should therefore 
not be confounded with a reduction of all phenomena to bodily processes. Frege 
formulates this in the following way: ‘‘Facts! Facts! Facts!’ cries the scientist 
if he wants to emphasize the necessity of a firm foundation for science. What 
is a fact? A fact is a thought that is true’ (Frege 956, p. 307). The objectivity 
of the outer world is thus epistemically not primary, rather, it is only disclosed 
by the spiritual objectivity of a true thought at all which makes it what it is. 
Thoughts are therefore neither physical things in the outer world, nor inner 
ideas. And thus a third, independent realm of reality besides the physical and 
the psychic must be recognized. The specifically spiritual reality converges with 
the ideas therein that it cannot be grasped with the senses, but with the physical 
objects therein that it does not need an individual bearer to whose content of the 
consciousness it belongs.1 Frege formulates the triple difference in this way: 
‘One sees a thing, one has an idea, one apprehends or thinks a thought. When 
one apprehends or thinks a thought one does not create it but only comes to 
3. What is meant hereby can be elucidated by the example of the cello, which has been men-
tioned several times during this conference. The cello is in one respect a physical object like 
any other, but its music – as music – can not be comprehended adequately in physical terms. 
However, that which can not be grasped in physical terms is not at all to be counted as entirely 
psychic. Here, then, the limits of the dual scheme “physical-psychic” again appear clearly. For 
music is (like any of the arts) not a purely subjective reality, because it transcends the narrow 
field of psychic experiences. The specific objectivity that pertains to it must therefore be defined 
as spiritual objectivity or truth, and thus distinguished from the physical and the psychic modes 
of being in the same degree. [The paper was originally presented at a public conference held by 
The Department of Philosophy at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, the Kirchliche 
Hochschule Bethel, and the Evangelische Akademie Iserlohn in 200, Ed.].
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stand in a certain relation, which is different from seeing a thing or having an 
idea, to what already existed beforehand’ (Frege 956, p. 302, note ).
At this point, obviously, a final question must be asked: Is the thought, whose 
specific spiritual objectivity has now been clearly outlined in relation to the 
modes of being of bodily and mental phenomena, a third kind phenomena in 
itself, so that one could talk about a physical “World ”, a psychic “World 2” 
and a spiritual “World 3” (cf. Popper 979)? Or is the understanding of three 
separate “worlds” next to each other ultimately incompatible with the monistic 
basic intuition of our thinking, so that the third phenomena of the spirit must be 
understood as an in itself differentiated unity of the bodily and the mental?
VI. Conclusions
As a conclusion to the presented line of thought it can now be said that the 
spiritual objectivity of the thought is logically primary in the sense that it has 
been elucidated in comparison to the objectivity of the material world and 
the subjectivity of the psychic ideas. The facts of the natural outer world can 
namely only be recognized as such, when they stand in a spiritual context, 
which grounds their objective validity or truth. In the same way, the individual 
psychic ideas can only reflectively become conscious of themselves when the 
subject transcends his private inner world onto a spiritually constituted per-
sonality. The objectivity of the spiritual thus conceived is therefore a “third” 
in the sense of an in itself differentiated unity of physical and psychic reality, 
which can only be recognized as realms of reality in their own right in the 
medium of the spiritual.
In this way it becomes possible by the in itself differentiated unity of the 
spirit, not to indiscriminately spiritualize the other of the spirit (i.e. the natural 
outer world and the always individual inner world). Hence, it can be avoided 
that the differences on which the possibility of rational recognition depends, 
blur into a vague sameness. Rather, the rational recognition of the spirit is in a 
position to gain a distance without falling apart as a result. Thereby that which 
is not immediately spirit gets the possibility of an appropriate and individual 
consideration, through which the whole field of knowledge does not yet fall 
into unconnected partial areas. The possibility of a rational recognition is 
dependent upon this genuinely spiritual mediation of inner and outer world, 
and the objective truth of it can be distinguished with good reasons from the 
constitutive subjectivity of psychic phenomena. Only in this way does the 
subject gain access to the being in itself of an exterior world that is different 
from it, as well as to the reflexive consciousness of its own interior world.
The reminder of Frege’s considerations as they have been presented is 
therefore not first of all motivated by historical interest. For Frege’s thinking 
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was, at the beginning of the 20th century, situated in the frame of a very fruit-
ful discussion, which mobilized against a psychological reduction of thinking, 
and thereby provided important insights for philosophy, theory of science and 
anthropology. There are many indications today that thinking, 00 years later, 
is facing a similar task. Just like the great successes of the empirical sciences in 
the second half of the 9th century gave the impulse to a psychological deriva-
tion of the spiritual, today, in the form of the progress in neuropsychological 
and neurophysiological insights, we experience a flood of beginnings, which 
again make a psychological or simultaneously a physiological derivation of the 
spiritual their goal. It might therefore again be profitable to mobilize against 
this reduction of the spirit by emphasizing the qualitative difference between 
the spiritual on the one side, and the bodily and the mental on the other. This 
should of course not be done in order to “widen” the mistaken substance dualism 
between the bodily and the mental by new, just as mistaken dualisms. Rather, 
through a specified concept of the spiritual, the possibility appears that the in 
itself differentiated unity of the bodily and the mental may be determined as 
the spiritual unity of body and mind.
Axel Hutter




Bieri P (997), ‘Generelle Einführung’, in Bieri P (ed.), Analytische Philosophie 
des Geistes, Weinheim: Belz Athenaeum.
Frankfurt HG (97), ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person‘, in 
The Journal of Philosophy 68, pp. 5–20.
Frege G (956), ‘The Thought: A Logical Inquiry’, translated by Geach PT, 
in Mind, New Series, Vol. 65, No. 259, pp. 289–311.
Hermanni F and Buchheim T (eds.) (2006), Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Ant-
wortversuche aus medizinisch-naturwissenschaftlicher, philosophischer und 
theologischer Sicht, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.
Kant I (929), Critique of pure Reason, translated by Kemp Smith N, London: 
Macmillan.
Nagel T (97), ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, in The Philosophical Review 
83, pp. 435–450.
Plato (1928), Sophists, in Plato VII, Loeb Classical Library, translated by 
Fowler HN, London and Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek der LMU Muenchen
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 05.11.15 09:56
20 Spiritual Objectivity
Popper KR (979), ‘On the Theory of the Objective Mind’, in Popper KR, 
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford and Nwe York: 
Oxford University Press, pp 53–9. 
Rorty R (965), ‘Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories’, in Review of 
Metaphysics 9, pp. 2–5.
Spaemann R (996), Personen: Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen 
’etwas’ und ’jemand’, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. 
Strawson PF (959), Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London 
and New York: Methuen.
Strawson PF (2003), ‘Freedom and Resentment’, in Watson G (ed.), Free Will, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 72–93.
Wittgenstein L (1958), The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for 
the “Philosophical Investigations”, Basil Blackwell: Oxford.
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek der LMU Muenchen
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 05.11.15 09:56
